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Doing Their Jobs:  
An Argument for Greater Media Access 
to Settlement Agreements 
Suzanna M. Meyers* 
INTRODUCTION 
What do exploding pickup trucks, the Catholic priest sexual 
abuse scandal, and police officers’ overtime compensation have in 
common?  These topics have captured the attention of both the 
news media and the general public, and each has been the subject 
of a confidential settlement agreement.1  It is not clear how many 
settlement agreements contain confidentiality clauses, but many 
believe that these clauses are ubiquitous.2 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004.  B.A., magna cum laude, 
George Washington University, 2001.  The author would like to thank the editorial staff 
of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for their hard 
work preparing this Note for publication.  The author also appreciates the guidance and 
insight of Professor Abner Greene. 
1 See Adam Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South Carolina, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at A1 (“The Catholic Church scandals are one reason for a renewed 
interest in the topic of secrecy in the courts, legal experts say.”); see also Phillips v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding for the trial court to determine 
whether there was good cause to seal settlement information related to explosions of fuel 
tanks of General Motors trucks after the Los Angeles Times moved to intervene in order 
to unseal); Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding that the 
interests of intervenors Landmark Communications, Inc. and Virginia Newspapers, Inc. 
were stronger than the defendant city’s interests in confidentiality in its settlement with 
police officers over back pay and overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act). 
2 See, e.g., Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: 
Information About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 676 
(2001). 
MEYERS FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:16 PM 
604 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:603 
There is natural conflict between the inclination of parties to 
keep their disputes under wraps and the public’s desire for 
information.  The employment of confidentiality permits parties to 
keep private the terms of their agreements, thus promoting 
consensus among them.3  At the same time, journalists seek to 
publicize the details of such agreements in order to fulfill their 
roles as conduits of news to the public; the confidential deals may 
pertain to safety hazards or spur further litigation.4  Adding to this 
tension is the role that courts play as settlement facilitators.5  
Courts often seal agreements and also have been known to 
mandate settlement discussions.6 
This Note will address the conflict that confidential settlements 
cause between settling parties on one side and a press7 desiring to 
inform the public of matters of interest, such as the workings of the 
government, on the other side.  It will propose a solution that 
considers the often-sensitive characteristics of the cases as well as 
the press’s and general public’s right of access.8 
To fully comprehend the significance of confidential 
settlements, one must first consider the changing landscape, 
marked by an increasing number of settlement agreements with 
secrecy provisions.9  Although individuals once debated the merits 
of settlement itself, settlements are so entrenched today that the 
dialogue is now dedicated to the secrecy aspects.10  As such, Part I 
of this Note will discuss the roots of the confidentiality movement 
 
3 See infra Part I.D. 
4 See infra Part II. 
5 See infra Part I.C. 
6 See infra Part I.B. 
7 The term “press” in this Note is used interchangeably with “media” and similar 
terms, and does not refer specifically to print news sources. 
8 For purposes of discussion, this Note will consider press access as synonymous with 
a grant of access to the broader public.  It should be noted, however, that the author 
would advocate a view of access recognizing the press’s special function. See infra Part 
III. 
9 See infra Part I. 
10 See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 
2619 (1995) (arguing that settlements should promote public values in addition to those 
of the private parties); see also Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and 
Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991) (arguing that parties should 
be able to formulate settlement agreements to meet their needs “with minimal intrusion 
from outside forces”). 
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and the arguments in favor of confidentiality clauses, the most 
significant being the promotion of party autonomy and privacy.  In 
Part II, the discussion next will turn to press access rights and how 
they apply to settlement agreements.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized the important function that the press plays as a 
“surrogate” for the general populace,11 including the ability of the 
press to inform individuals about events regarding which they 
otherwise would lack information.  The Court also has recognized 
the parallel role of providing a check on government.12  These 
press roles, discussed in Part II.A, create a strong rationale in favor 
of greater access to settlement agreements.  Although courts have 
not encouraged disclosure of settlement information to either the 
press or the greater public, Part II.B of this Note will explore 
possible roots of access rights that include the First Amendment, 
sunshine laws, court rules, the common law, and contractual flaws.  
Part II.C will explore the manner in which courts have grappled 
with these rights. 
Finally, Part III of this Note will propose that the press should 
receive greater access to settlement agreements, but that courts and 
especially journalists themselves should use discretion to consider 
party privacy.  Litigation and court rules serve as the most 
effective means to increase press access and can provide neutral 
guidelines—before disputes arise—for disclosing.  After such 
guidelines develop, courts must apply them on case-by-case bases, 
in accordance with legislative and judicial intent. 
I.  SOURCES OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
It is first necessary to lay the groundwork for the debate.  As 
this Note will now recognize, the discussion has emerged with the 
increase of the incidence of settlement and the accompanying 
increase in court involvement.  After acknowledging the trends, 
this Note will show that the arguments in favor of confidentiality 
 
11 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980).  Holding 
that there is a right under the First Amendment to attend criminal trials, the Court made 
the observation that the press often serves as a proxy for the public. See id. at 580. 
12 See infra Part II.A. 
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and the related case law focus on the privacy interests of individual 
litigants. 
A. The Role of Settlement 
Settlement plays an increasingly dominant role in today’s 
dispute-resolution landscape.13  Proponents of pre-trial settlements 
provide various rationales, including a preference on the part of 
legislatures and judges for alternative-dispute resolution,14 the 
desire to ease caseload,15 the benefits when parties come to their 
own solutions,16 and the “time-consuming nature” 17 of trials and 
their cost.18  Those who oppose the trend toward settlement also 
cite a litany of reasons: settlement does not create precedent;19 it 
excludes relevant public values from the dispute;20 and it tips the 
balance of power away from parties with fewer economic and legal 
resources.21  Regardless, settlements are here to stay.  The debate 
over the pros and cons of settlement itself has given way to the 
 
13 See Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at 24, 26 
(comparing the 10 percent of civil cases filed in 1970 that resulted in trial with the 2.2 
percent filed in 2001). 
14 See Samborn, supra note 13, at 26. 
15 See Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality 
in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 293 (1999) (“Settlement, it is 
contended, conserves scarce judicial resources and relieves a court’s crowded dockets—
weighty objectives in a world characterized by too few judges, too many lawyers, and an 
overflow of disputes.”). 
16 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2673–75 (1995) 
(discussing the benefits of settlement over litigation, including the ability of parties to 
incorporate their individual values into the agreement, as opposed to the “all or nothing” 
approach of litigation). 
17 See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 2 (2000); see also Samborn, supra note 13, at 26. 
18 See STONE, supra note 17, at 2; see also Samborn, supra note 13, at 26. 
19 See Samborn, supra note 13, at 26 (“‘It doesn’t produce any publicly made law,’ 
says U.S. District Judge Sarah S. Vance of the Eastern District of Louisiana.  ‘There is no 
verdict, no appeal, no precedent.’”). 
20 Luban, supra note 10, at 2634–35; see id. 
21 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 2667. 
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debate over whether particular cases should be settled, and how 
settlement should unfold.22 
B. Court Involvement in Settlement 
Press-access disputes often revolve around court involvement 
in the settlement procedure.  Such intervention may give rise to 
enforcement of the First Amendment on behalf of press interests 
based on the argument that court involvement is state action.23  
Court-annexed alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) represents a 
major area of such court involvement, emerging in the 1970s in 
both optional and mandatory forms.24  Specifically, Congress 
approved three court annexed arbitration programs in 1978 for 
federal district courts.25  Since then, both state and federal courts 
have employed ADR programs with regularity.  Approximately 
one quarter of the federal district courts and one half of all state 
courts had implemented some type of arbitration program by 
1998.26 
The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act 
(“JIAJA”) established a general structure for the federal court-
annexed arbitration program.27  As a result of the JIAJA, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence are inapplicable to ADR, and there is no 
requirement that arbitrators issue findings of fact or conclusions of 
law.28  As such, arbitrators possess great discretionary power.29  If 
a party to arbitration fails to request a trial within thirty days of a 
 
22 See id. at 2664–65 (“For me, the question is not ‘for or against’ settlement (since 
settlement has become the ‘norm’ for our system), but when, how, and under what 
circumstances should cases be settled?” (footnote omitted)). 
23 See infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of state action. 
24 See STONE, supra note 17, at 4. 
25 See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique 
of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2172 (1993). 
26 See STONE, supra note 17, at 4.  In addition, there were fifty-one district courts with 
mediation programs, forty-eight with summary jury trial, and fourteen with early neutral 
evaluation. See id.; see also Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action 
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 580 n.3 (1997) (defining 
principal types of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), including arbitration, 
mediation, and early neutral evaluation). 
27 See Bernstein, supra note 25, at 2177. 
28 Id. at 2178. 
29 See generally id. 
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decision, the conclusions bear the same force as a trial judgment 
and cannot be appealed.30 
Courts involve themselves in settlement disputes through 
modes other than ADR as well.  For example, courts issue 
protective orders that bar the dissemination of settlement 
information.31  Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
permits such protective action;32  the rule mandates that the party 
seeking to limit the flow of information show good cause for doing 
so.33  Yet, because rule 26(c) applies to discovery, it lacks direct 
relevance to ADR procedures.  Still, it exemplifies the balance 
courts must strike between confidentiality and the public’s desire 
for information pertinent to court decision-making processes.34  
Similarly, courts also may approve settlements, file them, dismiss 
cases upon settlement, enforce settlements, or implement a 
combination of these measures.35 
 
30 Most districts also require the party requesting a trial to post bond for the arbitrator’s 
fees and costs. See id. at 2183. 
31 See, e.g., United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 854 (2d Cir. 
1998) (upholding denial of newspaper’s motion to intervene in order to vacate a 
protective order regarding a draft settlement agreement). 
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (authorizing courts to “make any order which justice requires to 
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden 
or expense”). 
33 See Dore, supra note 15, at 329–30 (“This entails establishing that the information 
implicates a cognizable property or privacy interest entitled to protection and that 
disclosure of such information would work a clearly defined and serious injury.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
34 See, e.g., Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 609 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“The 
[c]ourt [finds] that the agreement is a public document because it is filed in [c]ourt and 
because it requires [c]ourt scrutiny and approval for fairness.  It should be accessible to 
the public for review of the [c]ourt’s fairness in its decision-making, unless the reasons 
for confidentiality outweigh the reasons for public access[,] which they do not.”). 
35 See, e.g., Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1014 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to seal the record without 
compelling reason, where sealing had been a condition of settlement).  In addition to 
sealing, the lower court in Brown also dismissed the case. See id. 
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C. Case Law in Favor of Confidentiality: Focus on Encouraging 
Settlement 
The rationales for denying media and other public access to 
settlement information involve the individual litigants’ interests36 
and the promotion of settlement.37  The Second Circuit has cited 
article III of the U.S. Constitution and its attendant dispute-
resolution authority to support the approval of confidentiality 
clauses by federal judges in order to encourage “open discussion” 
among parties and thereby foster settlement.38  An example of the 
authority is City of Hartford v. Chase,39 in which Hartford settled a 
dispute with developers working on a downtown construction 
project and presented the settlement—which included a 
confidentiality agreement—to the court.40  In turn, the court issued 
an order that adopted the parties’ settlement agreement,41 and 
despite the public’s interest in the city’s business, the Second 
Circuit denied a newspaper and its reporter’s motion to intervene.42  
Nevertheless, the court indicated that sealing should not transpire 
“without a compelling reason, and interested parties should be 
given an opportunity to challenge . . . .”43  The court also stressed 
that the trial court, rather than the parties, should impose 
confidentiality agreements.44 
 
36 See Fox v. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d 499, 507 (Tex. App. 1993) (discussing the 
interests of a minor who was a sexual-assault victim). 
37 See, e.g., United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 856 (2d Cir. 
1998) (“In a perfect world, the public would be kept abreast of all developments in the 
settlement discussions of lawsuits of public interest.  In our world, such disclosure 
would . . . result in no settlement discussions and no settlements.”).  This case can be 
partly discounted in the argument against access to settlement agreements because the 
materials in question were draft settlement documents presented to the court as part of 
ongoing negotiations, and did not constitute a final settlement. See id. at 855–56. 
38 See id. at 856. 
39 942 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1991). 
40 See id. at 132. 
41 See id. 
42 See id. at 135–36. 
43 Id. at 135. 
44 See id. at 136 (“We do not, of course, by this decision, in any way mean to give 
parties carte blanche either to seal documents related to a settlement agreement or to 
withhold documents they deem so ‘related.’  Rather, the trial court—not the parties 
themselves—should scrutinize every such agreement . . . and it is only after very careful, 
particularized review by the court that a [c]onfidentiality [o]rder may be executed.”). 
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D. Arguments in Favor of Confidentiality: Focus on Individual 
Litigants 
The interests of individual litigants dominate the arguments in 
favor of confidentiality, and the case law reflects this reality.  The 
most prominent anti-access argument is that if parties lack 
confidentiality assurances, they will hesitate to settle,45 and thereby 
burden the “already oversubscribed judicial system” with trials.46  
Even if parties settle without guarantees of confidentiality, they 
may limit their disclosures because the public may screen 
information related to the settlement process.47 
Confidentiality also ensures the privacy of parties.48  Both 
individuals49 and companies—the latter group sometimes 
contending with simultaneous negotiations or suits50—have argued 
that party privacy should not be sacrificed for transparency.  
According to Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, plaintiffs in cases 
involving “sexual harassment, defamation, and employment” are 
also zealous advocates for privacy because they “have strong 
interests in not publicizing the underlying facts of their 
cases . . . .”51  The Supreme Court has held in favor of press rights, 
 
45 See Dore, supra note 15, at 304. 
46 See id. 
47 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 2685 (arguing that parties will be reluctant to 
bring “nonlegally relevant” factors, such as emotional concerns and financial 
information, to the table).  This argument applies most directly to access to all settlement 
information, not just the agreement itself.  The information about the actual agreement, 
while potentially damaging, is less likely to harm the parties than the aggregate 
information leading to the settlement.  That topic is not specifically addressed herein. 
48 Indeed, such concerns have been cited as a rationale to keep records sealed even 
when there is a so-called “sunshine law” in place. See Fox v. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d 
499, 507 (Tex. App. 1993) (“Given the evidence presented . . . , the presumption of 
openness and the public’s need to know do not outweigh the victim’s compelling interest 
in maintaining his privacy[,] especially when considering the possibilities of irreparable 
damage to the emotional and physical well-being of the minor.”).  For a further 
discussion of state sunshine laws, see infra Part II.B.2. 
49 See id. 
50 See Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding 
that, in a case in which the court-encouraged settlement occurred after trial began, the 
court record should be open, despite defendant company’s concerns of harm to reputation 
and the potential for the records to be used in another proceeding). 
51 See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 2684.  Professor Menkel-
Meadow’s comment addresses a perception that defendants have the greatest privacy 
interests to lose through disclosure. See id. at 2684. 
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however, even in cases involving great privacy concerns.52  The 
Supreme Court noted that “privacy concerns [may] give way when 
balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public 
importance.”53 
Finally, confidentiality proponents argue that the main role of 
courts is to use the law to resolve private disputes without looking 
to “extraneous” matters such as the general public interest.54  
Secrecy advocates argue that any presumption of access resulting 
from a connection between filing and courts’ adjudicatory role is 
weak and easily rebutted by other considerations.55 
E. How Common Is Confidentiality? 
Because information is limited and anecdotal, it is difficult to 
tell whether secrecy clauses are common in settlement 
agreements.56  One insurance defense attorney noted that he had 
not “put a settlement together in the past five to six years that 
[lacked] a confidentiality clause.”57  Conversely, a Federal Judicial 
Center study suggests that parties seek protective orders only in 
five to ten percent of civil cases.58 
Nevertheless, various bodies have promoted proposals that 
would further secrecy.  In August 2001, the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform 
Mediation Act (“UMA”).59  Although no state has adopted the 
 
52 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2000) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects a radio commentator who broadcast an illegally intercepted cellular 
telephone conversation); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (reversing, on 
First Amendment grounds, a judgment against a newspaper that published the legally 
obtained full name of a sexual-assault and robbery victim).  In Bartnicki, although the 
commentator did not participate in the illegal interception, he “had reason to know” it 
was unlawful. 532 U.S. at 517–18. 
53 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534. 
54 See Miller, supra note 10, at 431. 
55 See Dore, supra note 15, at 393–95. 
56 See, e.g., Edward Felsenthal, Secret Accords in Civil Cases Are Under Fire, WALL 
ST. J., June 26, 1996, at B1. 
57 Fromm, supra note 2, at 676 (quoting California lawyer Glenn Gilsleider). 
58 See Dore, supra note 15, at 301–02.  This study only encompassed three federal 
judicial districts and did not address settlements that were not filed in court. See id. 
59 Reprinted in 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 165 (2002). 
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UMA,60 its drafting and its approval signify a move toward more 
confidentiality.  The UMA would encourage confidentiality 
through a privilege covering the admissibility of mediation 
communication during subsequent proceedings.61  Legislation of 
this sort makes “an agreement that comes out of mediation as 
confidential as the mediation process [itself].”62 
II.  SOURCES OF ACCESS 
On the other side of the access equation, one finds the 
constitutionally protected right of a free press.  This part will begin 
with a brief survey of the role of the press in America and the 
origins of that role, and will follow with arguments in favor of 
expanding press access. 
A. The Role of the Press 
Many scholars have argued that the press serves as a proxy for 
the public.63  The Supreme Court agreed, stating that “[i]nstead of 
acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by 
word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it 
chiefly through the print and electronic media.”64  Others assert 
that the American press provides a check on government65 by 
curbing governmental overstepping.66  This so-called libertarian 
 
60 See Philip Recchia, Question of Uniformity Takes Center Stage at ADR Program, 
STATE BAR NEWS, Mar./Apr. 2003, at 41. 
61 See id. 
62 Ellen Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides 
with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33, 45 (2001). 
63 See, e.g., JACK FULLER, NEWS VALUES: IDEAS FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 28 (1996) 
(describing one role of the press as “surrogates who help the public discover and weigh 
the evidence”). 
64 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980) (holding that 
there is a First Amendment right of public access to criminal trials). 
65 See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 63, at 77–78. 
66 Indeed, Thomas Jefferson, in a discussion of freedom of the press in his second 
inaugural address, said that “to open the doors of truth, and to fortify the habit of testing 
everything by reason, are the most effectual manacles we can rivet on the hands of our 
successors to prevent their manacling the people with their own consent.” FRED S. 
SIEBERT ET AL., FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS 47 (1956). 
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theory of the press traces its roots to the nation’s origins.67  
Advocates of this theory argue that the press must be protected 
from government interference.68  For example, in Justice Potter 
Stewart’s famous speech, “Or of the Press,” he posited that the free 
press guarantee of the First Amendment, as distinctive from the 
guarantee of freedom of expression, was included to ensure a 
check on the “three official branches” of government.69 
Nearly fifty years ago, Professor Theodore Peterson proposed 
that the “social responsibility theory” of press was modifying the 
libertarian theory,70 incorporating a changing view of human 
nature71 while responding to the consolidation of media interests 
into fewer hands.72  The libertarian theory considers the press as a 
check on government, but does not necessarily view the press as a 
vehicle for truth.73  In contrast, under the social responsibility 
theory, freedom of the press comes with a duty to reveal 
information to the public.74  As such, journalists remain motivated 
by a sense of responsibility to their audiences.75 
The definition of a journalist’s audience can vary, however, 
depending on context: 
The New York Times may consider a vote in Congress on 
free trade to be the most important story of the day while 
the New York Daily News leads with a deadly fire in the 
 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, Address at the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial 
Convocation (Nov. 2, 1974), in 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631, 634 (1975). 
70 See SIEBERT ET AL., supra note 67, at 73. 
71 See id. at 99–100 (hypothesizing that the emerging trend was away from seeing 
people as rational actors inclined to search for the truth, to seeing them as rational but 
hesitant to use their reason). 
72 See id. at 90 (“Editors and publishers are fond of saying that the growth of one-
newspaper cities has been accompanied by an increased sense of duty to their 
communities among the dailies which have survived.”). 
73 See id. at 76–77 (explaining that, through press freedom, many ideas would be 
revealed, both true and false, but citizens would ultimately discern truths). 
74 See id. at 94 (“A free press is free from all compulsions, although not from all 
pressures.  It is free for achieving the goals defined by its ethical sense and by society’s 
needs . . . .”). 
75 See HELEN THOMAS, FRONT ROW AT THE WHITE HOUSE 14 (1999). 
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Bronx.  This is because of each newspaper’s understanding 
of the community of readers it serves . . . .76 
Conversely, longtime White House reporter Helen Thomas 
stated in her memoirs that “It’s been said that the questions I 
ask . . . are the kind that are on the mind of a ‘housewife from Des 
Moines,’ and I hope that is true.  To me, she personifies what the 
nation wants to know . . . .”77 
B. Foundations of Press Access78 
This section will discuss various sources of press access, 
including constitutional rights, statutes and rules, and contractual 
flaws in secrecy agreements.  These origins of press access should 
be considered apart from the factual predicates to access, which 
will be discussed in the context of case law.79Moreover, both the 
origins of access and the predicates to access are distinguishable 
from the theoretical arguments in favor of greater press access, 
which will be discussed in this Note.80 
1. The First Amendment 
The obvious starting point for any discussion of a press right is 
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  This Note will now 
discuss the analysis such a claim must endure and the barriers to 
success of a First Amendment-based access claim. 
a) The Supreme Court Access Test 
The U.S. Constitution provides one source of the right of the 
news media to settlement information—although it has its 
limitations.81  The Supreme Court has recognized a First 
Amendment right of public access to criminal trials,82 but never 
 
76 See FULLER, supra note 63, at 46. 
77 THOMAS, supra note 75, at 100. 
78 It should be noted that “access” in this Note refers to the ability to gather 
information, as distinguished from the ability to print information once it is gathered. 
79 See infra Part II.C. 
80 See infra Part II.D. 
81 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
82 See Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). 
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explicitly has extended that right to civil trials.83  Moreover, 
journalists have far greater difficulty accessing court proceedings 
that precede a trial, even though the Supreme Court has granted 
press access to preliminary hearings tied to criminal trials.84 
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (“Press-Enterprise 
II”), the Supreme Court most clearly articulated when access rights 
exist and when courts can abridge them.85  The Court articulated a 
test that reviews “two complementary considerations”: whether 
there is a “tradition of accessibility” or “whether public access 
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular 
process in question.”86  Once the right of access attaches, “the 
proceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on-the-record 
findings are made, demonstrating that ‘closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest.’”87 
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly extended the 
First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings,88 it has 
acknowledged a history of access,89 and lower courts actually have 
 
83 See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) [hereinafter Press-
Enterprise I ]; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (applying the 
Richmond Newspapers standard in criminal contexts). 
84 Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 7, 13–14 (1986) [hereinafter Press-
Enterprise II] (holding that the way preliminary hearings were held in California, “where 
the preliminary hearing functions much like a full-scale trial,” necessitated a right of 
access that could only be outweighed by “higher values” when narrowly tailored to those 
values); see also DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 426–29 (1999). 
85 See generally Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 1.  The case drew its standard from 
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588–89, but applied it to a pre-trial proceeding, rather 
than to the trial itself. 
86 Id. at 7–9.  Note that while the Court refers to these considerations in the context of 
criminal proceedings, see id. at 8, this analysis is useful in discussing civil litigation and 
settlement agreements as well. 
87 Id. at 13–14 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510). 
88 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 558 (defining the “narrow question” at issue 
as whether there is a guaranty of access to criminal trials). 
89 See id. at 580 n.17 (“Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a 
question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials 
have been presumptively open.”).  Note also that in his concurrence, Justice Stewart 
wrote that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a 
right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal.” Id. at 599 (emphasis added). 
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recognized such a right.90  In Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 
the Third Circuit found a common law and a constitutional right of 
public access to civil trials based on the Press-Enterprise II test, 
and consequently held that there must be an important 
governmental interest in limiting public access and no less 
restrictive alternatives to fulfill that interest.91  The Court also 
noted “certain exceptions” to the presumption of openness: “The 
party seeking the closure . . . bears the burden of showing that the 
material is the kind of information that courts will protect and that 
there is good cause for the order to issue.”92  Good cause requires a 
showing of “a clearly defined and serious injury to the party 
seeking closure” that would occur if closure were denied.93 
Outside trials, journalists have even fewer rights of access, 
despite the First Amendment.  For example, the Supreme Court in 
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart94 looked to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(c) for guidance and specifically bypassed the First 
Amendment in a question involving a protective order that 
governed civil pre-trial discovery.95  The Court also has denied the 
press any special access rights not bestowed upon the general 
public.96 
 
90 See, e.g., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1073 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(holding that, in a matter arising out of a corporate proxy fight, the district court should 
have not denied the public, including two newspaper companies, access to portions of a 
hearing and its transcripts). 
91 See id. at 1070–71. 
92 Id. (emphasis added). 
93 Id. at 1071. 
94 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
95 Id. at 37.  Seattle Times is not on point for purposes of this discussion, as the issue 
was whether the newspaper, a litigant in the matter, could disseminate information it had 
already obtained through discovery.  Still, the denial of a First Amendment claim is 
relevant. 
96 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 
843, 850 (1974).  These cases dealt with press access to prisons, rather than to court 
proceedings or settlement. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 819; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 852. 
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b) State Action and Enforcement of Secrecy Agreements97 
The possible incompatibility of private, but court-enforced, 
secrecy agreements with the First Amendment presents another 
source of support for press access rights.98  According to Professor 
Alan E. Garfield, “[b]ecause enforcing a contract of silence 
penalizes a party for the act of speaking, the logical question to ask 
is whether this enforcement amounts to governmental suppression 
of speech, thereby implicating the First Amendment.”99  The 
Supreme Court has not recognized that enforcement of contract 
law triggers First Amendment protections,100 but it has held that 
tort law does.101  One possible explanation is that contract law 
involves the consensual actions of the parties while tort cases arise 
from nonconsensual actions defined by the government.102 
The Court also has extended First Amendment press 
protections to an area that appears to be closer to contract than to 
tort, but which may be distinguishable.  In Cohen v. Cowles Media 
Co.,103 the Court held that enforcement of a promissory estoppel 
claim was sufficient to constitute a state action and thereby 
implicate the First Amendment.104  The Court’s language, 
however, does not urge the view that there may be state action, and 
thereby a First Amendment enforcement right, in contract law.  
The majority opinion recognized that promissory estoppel “creates 
 
97 This author assumes for purposes of discussion that confidentiality is contractually 
based.  This is true in the cases cited in this Note.  The arguments for state action would 
be stronger, however, if the confidentiality provisions were statutorily mandated or court-
ordered. 
98 The speech interests directly implicated here are those of the parties to the 
agreements.  The ability of those people to disclose information, however, bears upon the 
abilities of the press and the public to receive it. 
99 Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 347 (1998). 
100 See id. at 348. 
101 See id.; see, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (using 
First Amendment standards in the context of intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
102 See Garfield, supra note 99, at 348. 
103 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991). 
104 In Cohen, a campaign worker gave newspapers information regarding an opposing 
candidate upon being promised by the newspapers that his identity would not be revealed. 
See id. at 665.  Cohen sued when both newspapers printed his name. See id. at 666; see 
also PEMBER, supra note 84, at 358–61. 
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obligations never explicitly assumed by the parties.”105  This 
distinction between contract law and promissory estoppel could 
lead to the conclusion that while enforcement of promissory 
estoppel may constitute state action, enforcement of contract does 
not.106  Another possible argument is that if the Court had focused 
on whether state power is used in a speech-suppressive manner, 
then the Court would not have limited its holding.107  For example, 
Garfield opined that “[i]f the Court focused on this issue, it would 
almost certainly find that state action is present in a contract of 
silence action.”108 
c) State Action and the Court’s Role in Settlement 
Press rights also may extend from the right of citizens to 
monitor the court system that they have entrusted to mete out 
justice.109  Court-annexed ADR is a clear example of courts’ 
ability to handle individual disputes for the public’s benefit.110  In 
fact, legislatures have enacted statutes requiring that certain types 
of disputes, often defined by the amount in controversy, be 
submitted to arbitration.111  Statutes like these may take the choice 
 
105 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 668. 
106 See Garfield, supra note 99, at 351. 
107 See id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964)). 
108 Id. 
109 Cf. Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992).  After 
sustaining serious injuries in an explosion, Brown sued Amoco Chemical Company, the 
parent company of the plant at which the explosion occurred. See id. at 1014.  When the 
parties settled, an important provision of the agreement was that the record of the case 
would be sealed, and the district court accordingly sealed it. See id.  Westlands Water 
District moved to intervene because the information in the record was relevant to its own 
suit against Amoco Chemical in an unrelated matter. See id. at 1014–15.  The Eleventh 
Circuit remanded upon finding that there was “nothing in the record to support the 
sealing of the court file.” Id. at 1016. 
110 See generally supra notes 23–36 and accompanying text. 
111 See Bernstein, supra note 25, at 2177 (stating that, under the Judicial Improvements 
and Access to Justice Act, “[s]uits for predominantly money damages that fall below a 
particular amount in controversy, which, depending on the district, ranges from $50,000 
to $150,000 and do not involve federal constitutional claims or conspiracies to interfere 
with civil rights, must be submitted to non-binding arbitration before a trial can be 
requested”); see also Reuben, supra note 26, at 594 n.53 (referring to state statutes such 
as California’s, which mandates pre-trial arbitration for all civil suits in which each 
plaintiff’s claim is worth less than $50,000, as well as Hawaii’s, which requires 
arbitration for personal-injury claims worth less than $150,000). 
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of forum away from the parties to the dispute.112  Consequently, 
unwilling parties are forced into ADR proceedings by the 
government and may be subject to an arbitrator’s abuse of 
power.113  Nevertheless, even mandatory ADR is non-binding,114 
thereby diminishing the pro-access argument.  Under the federal 
programs, if a party requests a trial, an arbitrator’s record and 
decision are nullified, a case resumes its original place on the 
docket, and the record and the decision of the arbitration cannot be 
introduced at trial.115 
A comparison to a test derived from state-action cases in the 
civil-rights context is useful as another means of evaluating the 
argument that the press deserves access to settlement agreements 
including those reached through ADR.  In Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co.,116 the defendant in a civil action used peremptory 
challenges to remove potential jurors who were African-
American.117  The Supreme Court held that the state action 
necessary for a civil-rights claim arose from that practice.118  The 
Court applied a two-part test: “first whether the claimed 
constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right or 
privilege having its source in state authority, and second, whether 
the private party charged with the deprivation could be described 
in all fairness as a state actor.”119 
The Court quickly dispensed with the first prong, finding that 
the deprivation there arose from a system governed by a federal 
peremptory challenge statute.120  Hypothetically applying the first 
prong to the realm of court-annexed ADR, the alleged First 
 
112 See Reuben, supra note 26, at 614. 
113 See id. at 614–15 (hypothesizing about instances “such as where a neutral [arbitrator] 
distorts the trial process by aggressively siding against one of the parties and encouraging 
or intimidating it into disclosing sensitive information that may be privileged”). 
114 See id. (discussing the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial and its implications for 
court-annexed ADR). 
115 See Bernstein, supra note 25. 
116 See 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
117 See id. at 617. 
118 See id. at 628. 
119 Id. at 620 (citations omitted). 
120 See id. (“Peremptory challenges are permitted only when the government, by statute 
or decisional law, deems it appropriate to allow parties to exclude a given number of 
persons who otherwise would satisfy the requirements for service on the petit jury.”). 
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Amendment deprivation would come from the parties’ use of the 
courts and related mechanisms to solve their disputes.  Analyzing 
the second prong of the state-action test, the Court paid special 
attention to the following factors: “[(1)] the extent to which the 
actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, [(2)] whether 
the actor is performing a traditional governmental function, and 
[(3)] whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by 
the incidents of governmental authority.”121  The Court found it 
significant that, without government authority, the peremptory 
challenge would not exist, let alone the entire system of jury 
trials.122  Likewise, one could say that court-annexed ADR would 
not exist without governmental authority, including the JIAJA123 
and attendant court encouragement.  Alternatively, one might 
argue that the “actor” is the neutral entity, selected to resolve the 
dispute, and resolution of disputes is a “traditional governmental 
function.”124 
Thus, it is possible to extend the analogy from the civil-rights 
state-action cases to the grant of protective orders and their 
subsequent sealing.  In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,125 a 
predecessor case to Edmonson, the Court found that “private use of 
the challenged state procedures with the help of state officials 
constitutes state action.”126  In granting protective orders and 
sealing settlements, courts also help private actors use 
governmental procedures in a similar way.  Of course, without 
state action, the First Amendment and the Court’s access test in 
Press-Enterprise II would not apply. 
 
121 Id. at 621–22 (citations omitted). 
122 See id. at 622. 
123 See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
124 See Reuben, supra note 32, at 621–22. 
125 457 U.S. 922 (1982).  In Lugar, a creditor sued a debtor, and also brought a 
prejudgment attachment action against part of the debtor’s property. See id. at 925.  
Based only upon the creditor’s ex parte petition, a court clerk issued a writ of attachment, 
and the county sheriff executed it. See id.  Using the same test later applied in Edmonson, 
the Court found that there was state action. See id. at 939–42.  The Court first stated that 
the procedure through which Lugar’s property was seized was created by the state. See id. 
at 941.  Next, the Court determined that the creditor was a “willful participant” with the 
state in attaching Lugar’s property under the state-created scheme. See id. at 941–42 
(quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)). 
126 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 933. 
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2. Pro-Access Statutes: Shedding “Sunshine” on Settlements 
 Pro-access regulations and statutes, including sunshine laws 
that open certain court records, documents, and proceedings to the 
public, provide yet another source for press access to confidential 
settlement information.127  Ten states have enacted sunshine 
statutes.128  Some, like Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a,129 are 
quite broad.  The Texas rule permits the sealing of court records 
only if “a specific, serious and substantial interest . . . clearly 
outweighs” both the presumption of openness that the rule 
mandates and “any probable adverse effect that sealing will have 
upon the general public health or safety.”130  The rule also requires 
that the party seeking closure show that there are no less restrictive 
means to “adequately and effectively protect the specific interest 
asserted” before sealing.131  Under rule 76a, the term “court 
records” includes “all documents of any nature filed in connection 
with any matter before any civil court”132 as well as “settlement 
agreements not filed of record, excluding all reference to any 
monetary consideration, that seek to restrict disclosure of 
information concerning matters that have a probable adverse effect 
upon the general public health or safety, or the administration of 
public office, or the operation of government.”133  By revealing the 
contents of even non-filed settlement agreements, the sweeping 
language of the Texas rule reaches more settlement information 
than the First Amendment requires. 
Still, Texas courts have not always applied rule 76a so broadly.  
For example, in General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple,134 the Supreme Court 
of Texas held that the lower court had abused its discretion in 
determining that certain discovery materials were “court records” 
 
127 See generally Fromm, supra note 2, at 682. 
128 See id. at 682 n.86 (naming Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, New 
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas and Washington as states with sunshine statutes). 
129 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. (listing three specific exceptions not relevant to this Note’s discussion). 
133 Id. (emphasis added).  This list also includes discovery—”not filed of record” but 
meeting the same qualifications as the settlement information—except as relating to trade 
secrets and other “intangible property rights.” Id. 
134 970 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. 1998). 
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pursuant to rule 76a(2)(b).135  Although the materials in question 
concerned tires returned to the manufacturer, and the issue was 
whether a defect in the tire tread had caused the plaintiff’s 
accident, the court determined that there was no evidence that the 
information “could adversely affect public health and safety.”136  
In another instance, the court did recognize the public interest, but 
held that the privacy interests of the parties outweighed that 
acknowledged public interest in disclosure.137 
The Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act also is worded broadly 
and appears to provide significant access to information.138  
According to the statute, 
no court shall enter an order or judgment which has the 
purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard or any 
information concerning a public hazard, nor shall the court 
enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect 
of concealing any information which may be useful to 
members of the public in protecting themselves from injury 
which may result from the public hazard.139 
The statute also voids as against public policy “[a]ny portion of 
an agreement or contract” with the purpose or effect of concealing 
information related to public hazards, as well as those portions of 
agreements or contracts with “the purpose or effect of concealing 
information relating to the settlement or resolution of any claim or 
action against the state, its agencies, or subdivisions or against any 
municipality or constitutionally created body or commission.”140  
 
135 Id. at 528.  Kenneth Kepple sued the Ford Motor Company and General Tire, Inc., on 
behalf of his son, who was seriously injured when the vehicle he was in rolled over. See 
id. at 522.  Kepple settled with General Tire, after which his attorneys moved on their 
own behalf to vacate a protective order regarding confidential documents. See id. at 521. 
136 Id. at 528. 
137 See Fox v. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d 499, 507 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that the 
privacy interests of a minor who had been sexually assaulted by a counselor with AIDS at 
the psychiatric hospital where the minor was a patient outweighed the public’s need for 
information). 
138 See FLA. STAT. ch. 69.081 (2002). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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Furthermore, only those trade secrets “not pertinent to public 
hazards” are exempt from disclosure.141 
Yet, other state sunshine legislation is narrower.  For example, 
the North Carolina and Oregon statutes apply only to settlements 
involving the government.142  Several states have failed to enact 
proposed sunshine legislation, as has the federal government.143 
3. Court Rules 
Court rules provide another justification for press access to 
settlement information.  In the fall of 2002, South Carolina’s 
federal trial judges adopted a rule banning all secret settlements.144  
In its short life, this rule has generated much controversy.  Citing 
instances like the Enron scandal, Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson, 
Jr. of the U.S. District Court of the District of South Carolina, a 
proponent of the rule, wrote, “Here is a rare opportunity for our 
court to do the right thing.”145  He also has stated that he was most 
concerned about plaintiffs who were offered additional settlement 
money in exchange for secrecy.146  Those opposed to the South 
Carolina rule have cited concern about litigant privacy147 and a 
decrease in the number of settlements that the rule may cause.148  
Thus far, the South Carolina court rule is unique; only Michigan 
 
141 Id. 
142 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.3(b)(2) (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.402 (2003). 
143 See Dore, supra note 15, at 311–12; Miller, supra note 10, at 429 n.7 (referring to 
failed legislation in Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, 
and Washington.  Note, however, that this information was current as of 1991.); see, e.g., 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Legislators Look at New Sunshine 
Amendment Draft, at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2003/0207sca1ca.html (Feb. 7, 2003) 
(outlining a new proposal before the California legislature that was introduced in 
December 2002, after a previous proposal had been defeated by one house). 
144 See Kathleen L. Blaner, The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Courts Deny Protection 
for Confidential Information, DEF. COUNS. J., Jan. 1, 2003, at 12. 
145 Liptak, supra note 1, at A1 (“Opponents of the [rule] argue that secrecy encourages 
settlements, which they say are desirable given limited court resources.”). 
146 See id. 
147 See Blaner, supra note 144, at 12. 
148 See Liptak, supra note 1, at A1. 
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judges have enacted anything remotely similar.149  The Michigan 
rule unseals all sealed settlement agreements two years after the 
sealing date, “[a]bsent an order to the contrary.”150 
4. Common Law Right of Access 
The common law right of access to court filings151 supports 
press access as well.  The right is not absolute,152 however, and its 
boundaries are uncertain.  In Nixon v. Warner Communications, 
Inc., the Supreme Court noted that “access has been denied where 
court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes.”153  
Broadcasters in Nixon were not given immediate access to copies 
of audio recordings taken during Richard Nixon’s presidency, even 
though the recordings were introduced into evidence in the trials of 
others implicated in the Watergate scandal and the transcripts of 
those recordings previously had been released.154  After noting that 
“relatively few” lower court decisions had defined the common 
law right of access,155 the Court recognized that the access right 
required a balancing of the parties’ rights against the public interest 
and the duties of courts.156 
Other courts addressing the limits of the common law right of 
access have held that the “strong presumption” may be outweighed 
 
149 See E.D. MICH. R. 5.4, available at http://www.mied.uscourts.gov/_localrules/civil/-
LR5_4.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004). 
150 See id. 
151 See Nixon v. Warner Comms., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). 
152 See id. at 598. 
153 Id.  The court goes on to name as an example a situation in which “records are . . . 
‘used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal’ through the publication of ‘the 
painful and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case.’” Id. (quoting In re Caswell, 
18 R.I. 835, 836 (1893)). 
154 See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 593, 610–11. 
155 See id. at 598–99 (citing State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 682 
(1965)). 
156 See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602.  In determining that the common-law right of access did 
not mandate release of the tapes, the Court ultimately did not engage in a pure weighing 
of the parties’ opposing interests because Congress already had created a vehicle to 
release the recordings to the public. See id. at 603 (outlining the duties of the 
Administrator of General Services through the Presidential Recordings Act to review 
Nixon’s tapes and preserve “those of historical value” and eventually give access to the 
public). 
MEYERS FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:16 PM 
2004] GREATER MEDIA ACCESS TO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 625 
only by “sufficiently important countervailing interests.”157  The 
obvious questions here, then, are what constitutes a countervailing 
interest and what elevates it to sufficient importance.  One 
approach requires the court to look to the public’s interest in 
education about the judicial system and at whether, as the Court 
recognized, but did not specifically determine in Nixon, the 
information would be used for improper purposes.158  Further, 
courts have held that the common law right of access may not 
apply when the information is filed under seal pursuant to a “valid 
protective order.”159 
5. Contractual Flaws in Private Secrecy Agreements160 
Press access also may emanate from decisions of courts to 
invalidate confidentiality agreements struck in instances when 
parties lacked equal bargaining power, displayed an absence of 
mutual assent, or lacked objective intent to make binding 
contracts.161  Press access additionally can arise when 
confidentiality contracts lack definiteness or when issues with the 
statute of frauds arise.162  The press may benefit from a court’s 
recognition that imbalances in bargaining power are compounded 
when the weaker party lacks incentive to challenge a secrecy 
provision because the secrecy will not cause that party direct 
harm.163 
 
157 See San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 
1999) (holding that the district court erred in denying the newspaper’s motion to 
intervene because it did not base its decision on the balancing factors); accord United 
States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995). 
158 See Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing 
the balancing test but determining that a presumption of access would “undermine, and 
possibly eviscerate” the court’s power when it has already issued a “valid protective 
order”). 
159 See id. (citing United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
160 This subsection is not meant to provide a complete picture of the possible contractual 
problems, but merely to give the reader an idea of the possibilities.  For a far more 
comprehensive look at the contractual issues, see Stephen Gillers, Speak No Evil: 
Settlement Agreements Conditioned on Noncooperation Are Illegal and Unethical, 31 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (2002). See also Garfield, supra note 99, at 279. 
161 See Garfield, supra note 99, at 279, 282–85. 
162 See id. 
163 See id. at 280 (“A plaintiff who accepts a generous settlement offer in a products 
liability action has little incentive to challenge a confidentiality provision since he is 
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The preceding contractual concerns relate to formation, but a 
court may also grant press access by voiding contractual terms 
concerning confidentiality as against public policy.164  Section 78 
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts would render a contract 
term unenforceable if “the interest in its enforcement is clearly 
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the 
enforcement of such terms.”165 
C. Litigated Cases Pertaining to Access 
Although there are a number of origins of press access to the 
contents of confidential settlement agreements, access to 
settlement agreements has varied according to several factors when 
such matters have arisen before courts.  Litigated access-related 
cases generally fit into three categories: (1) those in which a court 
has been involved in the settlement, (2) those in which the 
government has been a party, and (3) those tried in jurisdictions 
that have enacted sunshine or open-records legislation.  As this 
Note will now illustrate, access advocates have made their 
arguments based on these factual predicates with varying degrees 
of success. 
1. Court Involvement 
In cases that have yielded press access to confidential 
agreements, court involvement has been the most prevalent 
factor.166  Such cases range from those in which the court has 
simply sealed the settlement167 to those in which a trial 
 
already receiving compensation for his injury.  People external to the contract—those 
who either have been or will be harmed by the defendant’s products—bear the cost of his 
silence.”). 
164 See id. at 294 (“While freedom of contract might exist, there is no freedom to use 
contracts to undermine important or . . . societal values.”). 
165 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 78 (1981). 
166 See generally e.g., Jessup v. Luther, 227 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2000); Pansy v. Borough 
of Stroudsberg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994); Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d 
1013 (11th Cir. 1992). 
167 See Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 605 (E.D. Va. 1999).  The parties 
submitted their settlement to the court according to the common law requirement that a 
district court approve the terms of settlements pursuant to claims under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. See id. 
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commenced before the parties settled.168  Courts have asserted that 
members of the press have the right to monitor government 
functioning,169 particularly in cases that have moved to trial.170  In 
this vein, the Third Circuit named three specific values of public 
access to court records: (1) “informed discussion of governmental 
affairs by providing the public with [a] more complete 
understanding of the judicial system,” (2) the “public perception of 
fairness which can be achieved only by permitting full public view 
of the proceedings,” and (3) a check on the judiciary to assure “that 
the courts are fairly run and judges are honest.”171 
2. Government as a Party 
Several courts also decided in favor of access because the 
government was a party to a dispute.172  Examples include a 
 
168 See Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that 
“[t]his case actually went to trial, and, at least prior to the settlement agreement, the 
transcript of that trial was part of the public record.  The trial was an open public 
proceeding.  Moreover, and most significantly, the trial got as far as at least partial 
consideration by the jury.”). 
169 See, e.g., Boone, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (“[Public documents] should be accessible to 
the public for review of the Court’s fairness in its decision-making . . . .”); Soc’y of Prof’l 
Journalists v. Briggs, 675 F. Supp. 1308, 1309 (C.D. Utah 1987) (“In Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, Justice Stevens noted that the core of the First Amendment 
is access to information about the operation and functioning of government.”); see also 
Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing other circuits’ 
decisions basing the presumption of openness on “the importance of preserving ‘the 
public’s right to monitor the functioning of our courts’” (quoting In re Cont’l Illinois Sec. 
Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984))). 
170 See Brown, 960 F.2d at 1016 (noting that “it is the rights of the public, an absent 
third party, that are at stake”). 
171 Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 
345 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986) and 
Crystal Grower’s Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1980)).  A concrete 
contractor sued developers of an unfinished hotel and the bank that financed the project, 
and sought to unseal settlement documents relating to a settlement between the bank and 
the developer. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n, 800 F.2d at 341.  In reversing 
and remanding the district court’s denial of the contractor’s motion to unseal, the court 
determined that the district court’s decision lacked particularized findings regarding the 
need for continued confidentiality. See id. at 346.  It is important to note that government 
involvement in the resolution of the dispute also is often crucial to the argument that state 
action is involved in the settlement. 
172 See, e.g., Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. Pub. Records v. Des Moines Register 
& Tribune Co., 487 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1992) (recognizing, in a case 
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municipal government as defendant in a civil rights action,173 a 
public school as a defendant against in a case in which a 
newspaper moved to intervene,174 and a government commission 
that sued an employer in a collective-bargaining discrimination 
action.175  Courts have acknowledged the public interest in 
knowing what the government has done as a litigant in cases that 
involve confidential settlement agreements and the use of public 
monies to resolve disputes.176 
3. Statutes 
In cases implicating sunshine or right-to-know statutes, courts 
have sided with press interests to further the public’s health and 
safety177—particularly in cases involving products liability and 
class actions.178  Still, courts have interpreted the public’s interest 
 
involving a newspaper’s successful attempt to access information about the school 
district’s settlement with a school administrator, that “[c]ourts have generally held that 
settlement agreements with public bodies are subject to disclosure”); Pansy v. Borough of 
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversing a denial of a newspaper’s motion 
to intervene in the settled civil-rights action of a former police officer against the 
borough.  “The public’s interest is particularly legitimate and important where, as in this 
case, at least one of the parties to the action is a public entity or official.”).  Two other 
nuances of this case should be discussed briefly.  First, the court did not make any 
holding on the validity of the confidentiality order, but remanded the issue to the district 
court. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 792.  Second, the agreement at issue was not actually a court 
record, having not been filed, but it was presented to the court for approval and the case 
dismissed. See id. at 776. 
173 See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 776. 
174 See Jessup v. Luther, 227 F.3d 993, 994 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that denial of 
newspaper’s motion to intervene was improper in a case involving a former employee’s 
suit against a public community college, in which a settlement was reached following a 
court-conducted settlement conference); Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 487 
N.W.2d at 668. 
175 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Erection Co., 900 F.2d 168, 169 
(9th Cir. 1990) (reversing and remanding for additional findings regarding the propriety 
of granting a motion to seal the settlement). 
176 Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 487 N.W.2d at 669 (“[T]he outstanding 
characteristic of the settlement agreement was the fact that public funds were being paid 
to settle a private dispute.”). 
177 See supra Part II.B.2 for discussion of sunshine legislation. 
178 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 75 S.W.3d 669, 675–76 (Tex. App. 
2002) (upholding the trial court’s decision to unseal discovery documents under TEX. R. 
CIV. P. 76a in a class-action suit). 
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in settlement information narrowly179 and often have held that 
litigants’ confidentiality interests outweigh the public interest in  
access under such circumstances.180  
 
D. Pro-Access Theories 
Having discussed the possible origins of a press access right 
and the factual predicates to access, this Note will now turn to 
relevant policy-based arguments.  These arguments have been 
applied in the context of facts of individual cases, but should be 
considered separately from the factual bases. 
1. First Amendment Arguments 
Perhaps the most logical, yet least successful strategy, to secure 
broad access to settlement agreements has been the evocation of 
the First Amendment and its attendant support for an unhindered 
flow of information.  In fact, First Amendment ideals have held 
little weight in access cases involving settlement and other non-
trial or pre-trial settings.181  This results directly from the Supreme 
Court’s access test and its requirement that there be a history of 
access to the government function in question.182  None of the pro-
access cases discussed above was decided upon a First 
Amendment rationale.183  The First Amendment would become 
more forceful in this context, however, if courts concluded that 
enforcement of settlement agreements involved state action.184 
 
179 See Stivers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 777 So. 2d 1023, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2000) (holding that a fraudulent financing practice is not a “public hazard” under the 
Florida sunshine statute because a “public hazard” is a physical harm or a “danger to 
public health,” rather than a solely monetary injury). 
180 See, e.g.,  Fox v. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d 499, 507 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that 
the interests of a minor and his family in preventing harm that may result if information 
about the settlement of a sexual assault claim outweigh the access claims of a reporter). 
181 See, e.g., Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 608 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding 
that the right of access for intervenor newspapers lies with the common law right, and not 
with the First Amendment). 
182 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).  For a complete discussion of the 
Court’s First Amendment access requirements, see supra Part I.B.1. 
183 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 
F.2d 339, 342–43 (3d Cir. 1986); Boone, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 608. 
184 See supra Part II.B.1.c. 
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2. Public Interest Arguments 
Courts and commentators also have considered public interest 
as a rationale for access—through two distinct lenses.  First, some 
have examined public interest as general community interest or 
curiosity, but few judges or legal scholars have taken such an 
argument seriously.185  Those who have considered the matter have  
determined that general curiosity is not a sufficiently weighty 
public interest, even though judges in other speech-related 
contexts186 as well as in copyright law187 have hesitated to make 
such value judgments. 
On the other hand, a public interest argument based on public 
health and safety has proven more amenable to courts.  That is, the 
public should have information because it would be dangerous or 
harmful not to have it.  Alternatively, if the information does not 
find its way into the public consciousness, others who have been 
harmed in the same way may be disadvantaged in their own 
settlement negotiations and litigation with the party responsible for 
the harm.  In Wilson v. American Motors Corp., a plaintiff in a 
wrongful-death suit against an automobile manufacturer sought 
access to settlement information from a similar case against the 
same company.188  The Eleventh Circuit discounted the defendant 
automaker’s opposition to disclosure, which was grounded, in part, 
on the company’s desire that the second plaintiff would not use the 
 
185 See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Erection Co., 900 F.2d 168, 
170 (9th Cir. 1990) (warning against “improper use of the material for scandalous or 
libelous purposes”); Dore, supra note 15 and accompanying text (differentiating between 
“idle public curiosity (an illegitimate concern)” and legitimate public interest). 
186 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“For, while the particular 
four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its 
genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.  Indeed, we 
think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in 
this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the 
individual.”). 
187 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would 
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves 
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most 
obvious limits.”). 
188 See 759 F.2d 1568, 1569 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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information.189  As such, the court allowed for the revelation of 
information that encouraged “systematic efficiency.”190  In support 
of courts—like the Eleventh Circuit—that have limited 
confidentiality agreements for the sake of public interest, scholars 
have asserted that private settlements “shield[] lawsuits from the 
imposition of public values about important concerns, such as 
discrimination in the workplace, price fixing or unsafe products”191 
and represent a failure to inform the public adequately about 
potential harms.192 
3. Settlements in the Absence of Confidentiality 
As case law has illustrated,193 parties must recognize that 
simply bringing disputes to court—even if just for sealing or 
approval—can yield greater press access.  Courts have held that 
once the dispute comes to court, it “is no longer solely the parties’ 
case, but also the public’s case.”194 
4. Other Incentives to Settle 
Finally, some argue that even if confidentiality were not an 
option, parties still would settle.195  According to this view, the 
costs in time and funding of a trial are so prohibitive that parties 
would come to agreements in order to avoid further extension of 
disputes.196 
 
189 See id. at 1571 n.3 (“If formal proceedings occur in one court and are relevant to 
issues being presented in another court, judicial economy would mandate their 
availability.”).  Note that the holding was based on the general principle of monitoring 
courts. See id. at 1570. 
190 See Dore, supra note 15, at 305 (“Arguments for increased public access, then, rest 
on a vision of the judicial system that is broader than the individual lawsuit and that seeks 
to import the values of adjudication into settlement.”). 
191 See Samborn, supra note 13, at 26. 
192 See FLA. STAT. ch. 69.081 (2002).  The preceding discussion is not set forth to argue 
that the press and public have an absolute right to information related to private 
settlements.  It is simply to suggest that public interest is one rationale among several, 
i.e., monitoring government, that is an important consideration in the debate. 
193 See supra Part I.C. 
194 See, e.g., Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992). 
195 See Dore, supra note 15, at 304–05. 
196 See id. 
MEYERS FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:16 PM 
632 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:603 
III.  SOLUTION: INCREASED PRO-ACCESS COURT RULES AND  
LIKE-MINDED LEGISLATION, EMPHASIZING DEFERENCE  
TO PRESS INTERESTS 
Thus far, this Note has considered the rationales for secret 
settlement and the arguments in support of press access to 
confidentiality agreements.  Clearly, there are compelling 
arguments on both sides of the issue.  This piece now seeks to 
provide a feasible solution, with an eye toward an 
acknowledgement of the press’s special role in the United States. 
Effective judicial implementation of pro-access rules and 
legislation, such as the South Carolina court rule and sunshine 
statutes, provide the best answers.  Determinations in individual 
court cases often fail to yield principles of value to anyone other 
than the litigating parties.  Sunshine statutes, however, are 
effective only if courts interpret them broadly and with access in 
mind, rather than narrowing them into irrelevance.  Clearly, case-
by-case holdings will shape a relevant body of case law.197  
Therefore, courts must consider a number of factors in each case, 
such as whether the government is a party and the court’s role in a 
given settlement, in order to yield a body of law that will allow 
media members to fulfill one of their chief missions: monitoring of 
the government.198 
The purpose of journalism, however, goes beyond this 
watchdog function.  The press also supplies information about 
dangers to the public and even information based on simple public 
desire to know.199  Moreover, according to Professor Timothy Dyk, 
“the press serves important interests that public presence promotes 
 
197 See Dore, supra note 15, at 383 (suggesting that factors determining the legitimacy 
of secrecy are whether the government is a party, if there are health and safety concerns 
involved, and whether any of the parties are involved in similar litigation at the time); see 
also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 2695. 
198 See SIEBERT ET AL., supra note 67, at 56 (discussing the “libertarian” theory of the 
press, including the importance the “founders of the American system of government” 
placed on journalism’s role in providing a “check on government”). 
199 See FULLER, supra note 63, at 7 (noting that many journalists “take account of the 
pull of basic (even base) human curiosity” as part of the determination of what is 
newsworthy). 
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only remotely, if at all.” 200  That is, news media serve as 
surrogates to the public, whereas the public often has a more 
limited and individualized interest in information.201  Dyk adds that 
“the press performs an important (if controversial) ‘sifting’ 
function which the public cannot.  The press often receives access 
to information that is in part confidential, because by sifting the 
non-confidential information from the confidential, the press is 
able to funnel information to the public without sacrificing 
secrecy.”202  Dyk cites not-for-attribution interviews, through 
which the press receives information with the understanding that 
reporters will keep secret certain facts.203  This is not a normal 
occurrence in the settlement arena,204 but it could be a way for the 
public to receive information through the press while not 
compromising privacy interests. 
As a result of this more expansive press role, one might argue 
that a value exists in completely banning secrecy from settlements 
so that media members can fulfill all aspects of their mandate.205  
Yet, while the Supreme Court has endorsed certain protections for 
the press that are broader than those granted to the general 
public,206 the press has not received distinctive privileges for 
newsgathering.207  For example, in both Pell v. Procunier and 
 
200 Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. 
L. REV. 927, 935 (1992). 
201 See id. (“For example, the public may wish to pass through a disaster scene simply to 
travel from point A to point B, or even to satisfy individual curiosity.  The press, on the 
other hand, attends solely to report the event as a surrogate for the general public.”). 
202 Id. 
203 See id. 
204 See Fromm, supra note 2, at 691–92 (noting the infrequency with which publishers 
of settlement information publish confidential settlements, as well as the risk to attorneys 
of leaking information where there is a confidentiality agreement). 
205 See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 1 (reporting on and weighing the differing opinions 
regarding the then-proposed South Carolina court rule banning all secret settlements). 
206 See Dyk, supra note 200, at 927–28.  These areas of special protection include 
freedom from prior restraint and from compulsion to print material from people who 
would express a particular view. See id. (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)). 
207 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)); Dyk, supra note 
200, at 928–29 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)). 
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Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., the Court upheld regulations that 
prevented journalists from interviewing prisoners.208 
The Court’s jurisprudence is not entirely without language 
indicating special protection may be appropriate at times.209  Even 
in Pell, the Court stressed that the regulation was “not part of an 
attempt by the state to conceal the conditions in its prisons or to 
frustrate the press’[s] investigation and reporting of those 
conditions.”210  Further, these cases came before Richmond 
Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, which, while not recognizing a 
special right of press access, does recognize the importance of such 
access.211  Lower courts have also granted greater access rights 
than the Supreme Court has.212  While not exactly a rousing 
endorsement for unhindered press access to settlement agreements, 
this recognition of the special role of the media is one among many 
factors that support broader access. 
Yet, as the adage goes, with great privilege comes great 
responsibility.  While this Note advocates for greater press access 
to settlement agreements, it is important for the press to recognize 
those interests on the pro-confidentiality side—particularly 
privacy—and act accordingly.  This is not intended to suggest that 
media outlets should hamstring themselves or that the law should 
hinder members of the press from legally gathering and reporting 
information.213  But journalists, through such mechanisms as 
newsroom policies and codes of ethics promulgated by 
organizations like the Society of Professional Journalists,214 can 
accomplish the purposes of informing and catering to public needs 
 
208 See Pell, 417 U.S. 817, 831–32 (1974); Saxbe, 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974). 
209 See Dyk, supra note 200, at 942–44. 
210 417 U.S. at 830; see also Dyk, supra note 200, at 943. 
211 448 U.S. at 572–73 (“Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand 
observation or by word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly 
through the print and electronic media.  In a sense, this validates the media claim of 
functioning as surrogates for the public.”); see also Dyk, supra note 200, at 943. 
212 See Dyk, supra note 200, at 944–53 (recognizing categories—not limited to the 
settlement context or even to the entire dispute resolution process—in which lower courts 
have supported greater access for the press). 
213 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989). 
214 See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS (Soc’y of Prof. Journalists), available at http://www.-
spj.org/ethics_code.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2004). 
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and desires for information while respecting the legitimate interests 
of individuals in particular cases. 
Journalists have successfully balanced the individual and 
public interests in other contexts, and there is no reason to believe 
this general success could not be replicated in the realm of 
settlement information.  For example, reporters gather information 
through off-the-record interviews, keeping sources’ confidences 
while learning foundational information for news stories.215  
Historically, reporters have gone to great lengths to protect 
confidential information216 rather than breach trusts. 
Finally, the author of this Note does not suggest that the press’s 
interests in disclosing information should eclipse the right of 
parties to negotiate in private.  Although increased openness would 
be preferable, the practical reality is that complete disclosure is 
virtually impossible, and mandating access in all cases infringes 
upon the parties’ abilities to freely contract.  On the other hand, the 
media must continue their vigorous pursuit of information relevant 
to the public’s well-being—particularly when parties choose not to 
share it willingly. 
CONCLUSION 
“Governments want to keep things secret.  I suppose it is their 
job to keep some things secret,” said Seymour Hersch, the Pulitzer-
Prize-winning journalist who exposed the My Lai massacre.  “[I]t’s 
my job to get it out.”217 
 
215 Probably the best-known example of this phenomenon is the still-secret identity of 
“Deep Throat,” the confidential source that Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein cultivated 
for their reporting of the Watergate burglary in the Washington Post. See University of 
Illinois, Department of Journalism, Finder’s Guide to Deep Throat, at http://www.-
comm.uiuc.edu/spike/deepthroat/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). 
216 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667–68 (1972).  Branzburg, a 
newspaper reporter, was twice ordered to appear before grand juries based on stories he 
had reported on drug-related activity. See id. at 668–70.  The first time, he appeared but 
refused to disclose the identities of  individuals illegally possessing marijuana and 
making hashish in a picture accompanying his story. See id. at 667–68.  In the second 
instance, Branzburg moved to quash the summons. See id. at 669–70. 
217 ABRAHAM S. CHANIN, THE FLAMES OF FREEDOM 109 (1990) (quoting Pulitzer Prize-
winning journalist Seymour Hersch). 
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As Hersch has suggested, both the government and private 
parties “want to keep things secret.”218  Legislatures should 
determine what is in the public interest, and the courts should be 
mindful of the press’s ability to put sunshine statutes to use, as 
legislatures intended when crafting them.  Further, courts should 
adopt rules like those in South Carolina in order to make clear that 
parties cannot buy secrecy.  Such provisions will allow journalists 
to continue to do their jobs, and the public to reap the benefits. 
 
 
218 Id. 
